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judgment without consideration on a contingent basis to a professional
collection agency, a transaction perhaps violative of public policy embodied in section 489 of the Judiciary Law, 90 the court probably would
have declined to hold so broadly.
Consequently, the impact of Lee is not readily discernible. It would
appear, from the wording of section 5240, that the court has the broadest possible discretion with regard to the use of CPLR enforcement
proceedings. 91 The court's reliance, however, upon section 489 of the
Judiciary Law in conjunction with the assignment and its basis, leads
one to a different conclusion. The issue has never been before the Court
of Appeals. Significantly, Professor Siegel has concluded:
The problem has not been that CPLR 5240 does not supply such
power. It just seems to be a matter either of the lawyers not
pressing for that section's application, or the judges not taking it
as the broad source of authority it was intended to be.92
62 - ATrAcImNT
CPLR art. 62: Is the New York attachment procedure constitutional?
ARncICE

We live in an era in which the special problems of the indigent and
consumer have become the target of popular crusades.9 3 Recognizing
this, the courts have begun to remedy many of the long-neglected inequities facing this sector of the populace. A new balance in the creditordebtor relationship is being forged. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,9 4
a decision with broad implications for the consumer in general and the
poor in particular, commenced the reevaluation of this relationship.
At issue in Sniadachwas the constitutionality of a state garnishment
statute which permitted creditors to garnish wages as security for their
claims without prior judicial scrutiny, notice to the defendant, or a
preliminary hearing on the merits of the attachment. Defendant Sniadach attacked the procedure whereby notice was given subsequent to
the garnishment, contending that it violated her right of due process
without consideration and on a contingent basis, of these judgments to a
professional collector. This may prohibit the practice of consummating assignments

of these judgments on a contingent basis. This, however, does not prevent an
assignment of these judgments for a nominal consideration, which may circumvent
the proscription of the import of this decision. In order to avoid a CPLR 5286
sale of real property by the professional collector, the legislature should, in
effect, prohibit a CPLR 5286 sale by an assignee of such judgments.
Id. at 708, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
90 1d. at 701, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 584-85.
91 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5286, supp. commentary at 155-56 (1970).
92 Id. at 155.
93 For a discussion of this broad area of the law, see Symposium: Law and Poverty,
32 ALBANY L. REv. 1 et seq. (1968).
94 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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since it denied her a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the
impairment of her property. The property frozen by attachment in
Sniadach was half of defendant's salary, i.e., $31.59.1r
Noting that wages are a specialized kind of property9" and that their
loss by garnishment "may impose tremendous hardship"9 7 upon a
debtor, the Court held the statute unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 8 reversing the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decision which characterized the temporary loss of
defendant's wages as de minimis and outside the perimeter of the due
process guarantee.9 9 The simple test upon which justification for an
ex partegarnishment could be founded was, the Court said, the presence
of some compelling state or creditor interest. 0 0 Exactly what constitutes
sufficient indication of a compelling state or creditor interest was not
spelled out by the Court beyond the citation of four prior decisions, 10 '
which indicated that the state may show compelling interest where the
public health 0 2 or the preservation of credit 03 is endangered.
The philosophy of the Supreme Court in Sniadach has recently
been extended in Randone v. Appellate Departmentof Superior Court
of Sacramento County. 0 4 Declaring the statutorily authorized pre-judgment ex parte attachment of defendant's checking account by a collection agency to be violative of defendant's fifth and fourteenth amendment right to due process, 10 5 the California court interpreted Sniadach
as applicable to types of personal property other than wages. 106 Blair v.
05 See id. at 338.
06 Id. at 340.
97 Id.
08 Id. at 342.
99 Id., rev'g 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967).
While the loss was not an actual taking, the Court nevertheless found the temporary

impairment of defendant's wages to be substantial injury which was prohibited under
the Constitution. Id. at 340-42.
100 Id. at 339.
101Id., citing Ewing v. Mytinger 9. Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598-600 (1950);

Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31
(1928); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110-12 (1921).
102 Ewing v. Mytinger & Caselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
103 Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
104 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
The court indicated in its conclusion that it was following the principle of Sniadach.
It is submitted, however, that the court actually extended Sniadach. Compare 395 U.S.
337 (1969) with 5 Cal. 3d 536, 562, 488 P.2d 13, 30-31, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 726-27 (1971).
1l Id.(passim).
100 Expansion of Sniadach has received favorable critical comment. See, e.g., Note,
Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 COLUM. L. Rxv. 942 (1970); Note, Attachment and
Garnishment-Constitutional Law -Due Process of Law -Garnishment of Wages Prior
to Judgment Is a Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach case and Its Implications for
Related Areas of the Law, 68 MicH. L. REv. 986 (1970); Comment, Expanding Limitations
on Pre-Judgment Attachment: Reverberations of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 12
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Pritchess07 was cited as authority for the decision. The issue in Blair
was whether the remedy of an ex parte claim and delivery afforded by
statute violated due process. The court, construing Sniadach, concluded
that
the seizure of property under the claim and delivery law constitutes
a taking without due process of law. Although there may be extraordinary situations in which the summary remedy afforded by the
claim and delivery law is justified by a sufficient state or creditor
interest, that law . . is not narrowly drawn to cover only such
extraordinary situations. 08
While a different pre-judgment remedy was attacked in Randone,
the constitutional issues were substantially the same. The attachment
statute attacked in Randone authorized the pre-judgment "freezing" of
any property without notice. No proof of special need was required. 0 9
Without such a showing, the Randone court held that the statutory
attachment procedure deprived the defendants of their right to be
heard."" It further noted that the stautes contravened the holding of
numerous California courts "that the most fundamental ingredient of
due process guaranteed by [the] state constitution is a meaningful op' nx
portunity to be heard.'
The overbreadth of this statute was a defect similar to that of the
wage garnishment statute in Sniadach; it permitted the attachment of
any of the debtor's property, including the "necessities of life." 112 The
court noted that allowing such "necessities" to be attached required a
greater degree of jurisdiction when attached ex parte. It is possible, however, that even the use of a stricter standard in assessing the validity of
the attachment of necessities prior to hearing may not comply with the
defendant's right of due process. A profound question posed by Sniadach
and the cases that have followed it is whether the pretrial hardship
necessarily invalidates any ex parte attachment of "those assets constituting the necessities of life .... ,1"3 Indeed, this type of attachment
appears even more likely to constitute overreaching in view of the fact
that necessities are not likely to be fraudulently transferred by a debtor.
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 700 (1971); The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JoHN's L REv. 355,
379 (1971).
1075 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
108 Id. at 277, 486 P.2d at 1255-56, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 55-56.
109 CAL. CODE OF CiV. PTZAC. §§ 537, 537-S, 538 (West Supp. 1971).

110'1 his constitutional right, recognized in Sniadach, was more recently affirmed in
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); see Note, Boddie and Beyond: The Right of
the Indigent in Civil Actions, 18 CATHOLIC LAW. No. 1 (1972).
11 5 Cal. 3d at 550, 488 P.2d at 22, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 718.

112 Id. at 558, 488 P.2d at 27, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
113 Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 COLUm. L REv. 942, 964 (1970).
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Reassessment of New York's attachment statutes in light of the due
process philosophy expressed in Randone suggests that New York's
statutes are narrowly drawn as prescribed by Sniadach and Randone. By
allowing an initial attachment of any type of property without affording
the individual either notice of the attachment or a prior hearing to contest the attachment, 114 the California statutes failed to limit the use of
this "initial" deprivaton to those "extraordinary situations" suggested in
Sniadach. It is noteworthy that the admitted purpose of the statute was
"simply to provide unsecured creditors with 'security of the satisfaction
of any judgment that may be received.' "115 It is obvious, of course, that
mere security per se is not a compelling interest.
In New York the statutes are more limited and therefore less likely
to be overbroad. The CPLR restricts the availability of attachment to
eight situations, 06 seven of which apparently would fall within the special circumstance categorization espoused in Sniadach.
The provisions offering the creditor protection against fraudulent
transfer or disposal of a debtor's property are clearly based on sufficient
creditor need to permit garnishment or attachment without notice. In
Sniadach, where no special creditor or state interest was found, the court
mentioned that the creditor had an easily obtainable alternative remedy
to attachment, viz., in personam jurisdiction.11 This dictum would seem
114 5 Cal. 3d at 544, 488 P.2d at 17, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 713 (emphasis omitted).
115 Id. at 555, 488 P.2d at 25, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
116 See CPLR 6201:
§ 6201. Grounds for attachment
An order of attachment may be granted in any action, except a matrimonial
action, where the plaintiff has demanded and would be entitled, in whole or in
part, or in the alternative, to a money judgment against one or more defendants,
when:
I. the defendant is a foreign corporation or not a resident or domiciliary
of the state; or

2. the defendant resides or is domiciled in the state and cannot be personally

served despite diligent efforts to do so; or
3. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors or to avoid the service
of summons, has departed or is about to depart from the state, or keeps himself
concealed therein; or
4. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors, has assigned, disposed
of or secreted property, or removed it firom the state or is about to do any of
these acts; or
5. the defendant, in an action upon a contract, express or implied, has been
guilty of a fraud in contracting or incurring the liability; or
6. the action is based upon the wrongful receipt, conversion or retention,
or the aiding or abetting thereof, of any property held or owned by any governmental agency, including a municipal or public corporation, or officer thereof; or
7. the cause of action is based on a judgment, decree or order of a court
of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and
credit in this state, or on a judgment which qualifies for recognition under
the provisions of article 53; or
8. there is a cause of action to recover damages for the conversion of
personal property, or for fraud or deceit.
317 See 395 U.S. at 539.
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to indicate that the validity of the jurisdictional basis of garnishment
and attachment may be secure when limited to nondomiciliaries or nonresidents.
The CPLR corporate attachment provision 1 8 is so limited, but
where the individual defendant cannot be served "despite dilgent
efforts to do so,"" 9 a writ of attachment can be issued against a resident
or domiciliary of New York. Thus, the court could issue an order of
attachment "upon the mere affidavit of plaintiff's attorney that service
20
could not be made with due diligence."'
It can be argued that the creditor's interest here is not so substantial
as to outweigh the resultant harm to the defendant. Clearly, "an attachment deprives the defendant of the use and enjoyment of his property
at an extremely embryonic stage of the litigation and long before the
defendant's liability to the plaintiff is established."' 21 Moreover, section
6201(2) has been interpreted as having a purely jurisdictional function. 122 Therefore, the severity of this remedy may not be justifiable
since an adequate basis for jurisdiction is provided by CPLR 308, under
which in personam jurisdiction over a resident may be obtained by a
form of substituted service of process. The subsection is valid only insofar as it is necessary to provide a basis for jurisdiction; 123 in light of
CPLR 308, the subsection seems unnecessary. Furthermore, the mere
fact that the attachment will be voided if the defendant appears, does
not render the deprivation of a defendant's use of his property de
minimis.
The most forceful due process argument of the Randone court
centered on the "overbreadth" of the statute. Under the California
124
statute, any property, including necessities, was subject to attachment.
While certain types of property were statutorily immune, the immunizing provisions were considered an inadequate safeguard against
118 CPLR 6201(1).
119 CPLR 6201(2).
120 Note, Provisional Remedies in New York Reappraised Under Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.: A Constitutional Fly in the Creditor's Ointment, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 426,
440 (1970).
6201.02.
1217A WK&M
122 "It may be noted that the first two, if not three, subdivisions of 6201 are primarly
oriented in the direction of the jurisdictional function of attachment .... H. WAcrrEu.,
NEW YORK PRACrICE UNDER THE CPLR 186 (3d ed. 1970).
123 The Court of Appeals held, in Fishman v. Sanders, that mere service by publication,
made after a levy of attachment, would secure in personam jurisdiction over the temporarily
absent resident. 15 N.Y.2d 298, 206 N.E.2d 326, 258 N.Y.S.2d 880 (1965).
It is submitted that this decision may be questionable. The service by publication
did not seem to be the best available method of obtaining in personam jurisdiction;
service by publication under CPLR 315 is designed as a last resort.
124 CAL CODE OF CrV. PROC. § 537 (West Supp. 1971).
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the unlawful taking of property since the attachment order was issued
without prior judicial scrutiny. If the defendant sought to challenge the
attachment thereafter, he could be forced to wait for a period of twentyfive days before his use of the property could be restored.125 The hardship of this procedure is obvious. In New York, exemptions to the
creditor's right to attach the defendant's property are provided in CPLR
5205 and 5206. Section 5205 expressly exempts most necessities from
attachment and, unlike the California law, under section 6212 the
New York law allows judicial discretion in issuing an order of attachment. Moreover, the property-exemption statutes operate to bar the
sheriff from taking certain property ab initio.
The operation of these exemption provisions generally forecloses
the severe deprivation issue presented in Randone. Consequently, the
rationale expressed in Sniadach and Randone is less compelling in New
York. 28
The Randone court also relied on a federal court decision' which
held the former New York replevin 12s statutes to be constitutionally
inadequate. The New York statutes were analogous to the California
attachment statute in that provision was made for the ex parte seizure of
such everyday necessities as "[b]eds, shoes, mattresses, dishes, tables
... .
"129 Treating these necessities specially, i.e., similarly to the treatment of wages in Sniadach, the court found them to be "a specialized
type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system,
the taking of which on the unilateral command of an adverse party 'may
30
impose tremendous hardships' on the purchasers of these essentials."'
Moreover, the court in Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co. found the
statute deficient since it was not "narrowly drawn" to meet only those
"extreme situations" to which the Supreme Court alluded in Sniadach.131
125 5 Cal. 3d at 546, 488 P.2d at 19, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.

126 An example of this would be the argument the court made in reference to the right
to be heard. The Randone court noted that "due process requires, at a minimum, that an
individual be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to being subjected by
force of law to a significant deprivation." 5 Cal. 3d at 550, 488 P.2d at 21, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
717 (emphasis added). Under New York's procedure this "significant deprivation" would
not arise
and consequently the right to be heard would not be impaired.
127 Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
128 CPLR art. 71.
129 315 F. Supp. at 722.
130 Id.
131 The court further found article 71 to be unconstitutional because it violated the
fourth amendment. The court pointed out that under the former CPLR 7110,
[i]f a chattel [was] secured or concealed in a building or enclosure and [was] not
delivered pursuant to his demand, the sheriff [could] cause the building or enclosure to be broken open and [could] take the chattel into his possession.
Id. at 721, quoting former CPLR 7110.
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The CPLR replevin provisions have since been amended to conform with Laprease.13 2 This, again, is an attempt to strike a balance in
the creditor-debtor relationship. Prior to these amendments, "no application to the court was [usually] necessary in order to permit a
plaintiff in replevin to obtain the services of a sheriff.., to seize chattels
claimed to be owned by plaintiff."' 33 The prior law also permitted the
"[b]reaking into premises without notice. . .,,3 in order to seize or
remove property.
In two decisions 135 subsequent to the amendments of article 71,
this balancing of creditor-debtor interests became apparent. The material factors affecting this balance, noted in Welbilt Equipment Corp. v.
La Creme Bakery, were
the precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected,
the manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the
available alternatives to the procedure that was followed .

balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished....

.

30

. the

The new replevin statute leaves the determination of what would
constitute such an "extraordinary situation" as to permit an ex parte
seizure of property to the court's discretion. In pertinent part is provides:
if plaintiff seeks the inclusion in the order of seizure of a provision
authorizing the sheriff to break open, enter and search for the
chattel [the affidavit must state] facts sufficient under the due process of law requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States to authorize the inclusion in the
order of such a provision. 3 7
The New York interpretation of an "extreme situation" remains
unsettled. However, it appears that the due process clause, requiring a
flexible standard by which each case may be judged on its individual
merits, will foreclose the use of a single rigid rule.
In conclusion, it is submitted that seven of the permitted New York
attachment grounds will successfully withstand a due process attack.
However, in light of the availability of CPLR 308 (notice statute) in
132 L. 1971, ch. 1051, at 1806-10, eff. July 2, 1971.
133 Finkenberg Furniture Corp. v. Vasquez, 67 Misc. 2d 154, 155, 324 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN's L.
REv. 355, 379 (1971).
134 Id. at 155, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
135 Id. at 154, 324 N.Y.S.2d 840; Wellbilt Equip. Corp. v. La Creme Bakery, 166 N.Y.L.J.
24, Aug. 4, 1971, at 12, col. 2 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 355, 379 (1971).

130 166 N.Y.L.J. 24, Aug. 4, 1971, at 12, col. 3, quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
137 CPLR 7102(c)(5) (emphasis added).
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conjunction with CPLR 301 (basis statute), CPLR 6201(2) appears -to
be unnecessary as a jurisdictional basis statute and therefore may be
held unconstitutional. Legislative reconsideration would be salutary.
A iTcrx 81 -

CosTs GENERLLY

CPLR 8101: Costs granted to defendant despite unsuccessfulness of his
counterclaim.
CPLR 8101 provides that "[t]he party in whose favor a judgment is
entered is entitled to costs in the action, unless otherwise provided by
statutes or unless the court determines that to allow cost would not be
equitable, under all of the circumstances." Where there is no counterclaim, determination of whom shall receive costs is a relatively simple
matter: the party who prevails on the plaintiff's complaint is entitled to
them. The matter becomes more complicated, however, when the defendant interposes a counterclaim. 138 If plaintiff prevails on his cause
of action and defendant fails on his counterclaim, plaintiff is clearly entitled to costs, absent special circumstances. 139 If plaintiff loses on his
complaint and defendant succeeds on his counterclaim, defendant is
obviously entitled to costs. But, if the parties both succeed or both fail
on their respective causes of action, who, if anyone, is entitled to costs?
In Graybill v. Van Dyne,140 the Supreme Court, Monroe County,
was called upon to determine who is entitled to costs when both the
plaintiffs and the counterclaiming defendant failed to recover on their
causes of action resulting from an automobile accident. The defendant
moved to strike the plaintiff's bill of costs against her, and the motion
was granted. 41 The court noted that under the Civil Practice Act and
the Code of Civil Procedure, "the weight of New York authority" was in
favor of granting costs to a successful defendant, even though he had
failed on his counterclaim. 142 Under the CPLR, the court concluded,
the test of which party is entitled to costs is who is the prevailing party,
i.e., "the party in whose favor a judgment is entered."'143 Where neither
party succeeds on his course of action, the rule remains that only the
138 See, e.g., Checketts v. Collings, 78 Utah 93, 95, 1 P.2d 950, 951 (1931) ('the authorities on the question are in irreconcilable conflict").
13
0 See CPLR 8102.
140 67 Misc. 2d 228, 324 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1971).
141 Id. at 232, 524 N.YS.2d at 294.
142 Id. at 229, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 292, citing Gibbons v. Skinner, 150 App. Div. 706, 135
N.YS. 820 (Ist Dep't 1912); Pagano v. Giuliani, 182 Misc. 375, 43 N.Y.S.2d 945, 946 (Sup.
Ct. Onondaga County 1943); Rohrs v. Rohrs, 72 Misc. 108, 180 N.YS. 1093 (N.Y. City Ct.
1911); Thayer v. Holland, 63 How. Pr. 179 (N.Y.C.P. 1882); Whitelegge v. DeWitt, 12 Daly

819, 328-24 (N.Y.C.P. 1884).
143 67 Misc. 2d at 230, 324 N.YS.2d at 293, quoting CPLR 8101.

